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Abstract
This Essay is written to outline the difficulties in establishing mechanisms for addressing
multi-national criminal activities when those efforts continue to be frustrated by rampant public
corruption. This Essay argues that the problems of public corruption are purposefully not ad-
dressed in the instruments which are intended to combat criminal activity. The Essay concludes
that international efforts will continue to be frustrated until nations determine that they will not
permit public corruption to void their efforts to better the lives of their populations and establish
within the four corners of their agreements mechanisms for identifying, investigating, and sanc-
tioning the corruption that undermines the goals of the agreements.
SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN THE STATE OF
AFFAIRS BETWEEN NATIONS: THE
DIFFICULTIES OF ESTABLISHING THE RULE
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
BECAUSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Charles S. Saphos*
PREVIEW
This Essay is written to outline the difficulties in establishing
mechanisms for addressing multi-national criminal activities
when those efforts continue to be frustrated by rampant public
corruption. This Essay argues that the problems of public cor-
ruption are purposefully not addressed in the instruments which
are intended to combat criminal activity. The Essay concludes
that international efforts will continue to be frustrated until na-
tions determine that they will not permit public corruption to
void their efforts to better the lives of their populations and es-
tablish within the four corners of their agreements mechanisms
for identifying, investigating, and sanctioning the corruption
that undermines the goals of the agreements.
A. Great Expectations for International Cooperation
President Clinton of the United States observed in his
speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on
October 22, 1995, that:
All over the world, people yearn to live in peace. And that
dream is becoming a reality. But our time is not free of peril.
As the cold war gives way to the global village, too many peo-
ple remain vulnerable to poverty, disease and underdevelop-
ment. And all of us who are exposed to ethnic and religious
hatred, the reckless aggression of rogue states, terrorism, or-
ganized crime, drug trafficking and the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction.'
President Clinton continued by noting that: "Nowhere is coop-
eration more vital than in fighting the increasingly intercon-
* General Counsel, Interpol, U.S. National Central Bureau.
1. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 31 WKLV
CoMp. PREs. Doc. 43 (Oct. 22, 1995).
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nected groups that traffic in terror, organized crime, drug smug-
gling and the spread of weapons of mass destruction."2
Recognition of the need for multinational cooperation to
address organized crime, particularly the organized crime of
drug trafficking, is not a post-Cold War creature. The United
Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances' ("1988 U.N. Convention") states
in an introductory paragraph that the convention was drafted:
"Recognizing that eradication of illicit traffic is a collective re-
sponsibility of all states and that, to that end, coordinated action
within the framework of international cooperation is necessary
.... -" It would seem reasonable that the end of political frag-
mentation caused by the end of the Cold War would serve to
increase means of cooperation and further support the rule of
law in combating organized crime. However, there is little evi-
dence to support a belief that the "good guys" are winning.
When nations are enlisted in international efforts to combat
organized crime, there is an expectation that every nation and
every participating organization is participating in good faith.
This is also a tacit agreement between parties that each will com-
port itself lawfully in obtaining the goals of the agreement. This
tacit agreement and expectation of good faith includes a belief
that the participants will work for the good of all of the partici-
pants rather than to benefit a corrupting minority. Therefore,
agreements are entered into wherein a banking center, such as
Luxembourg,5 agrees to trace, freeze, and seize the proceeds of
foreign narcotics violations, without regard to domestic bank se-
crecy laws.6 This tacit agreement includes the expectation that
participants will, in good faith, address and punish public cor-
ruption when that corruption impedes the cooperation called
for in the agreement. Indeed, the expectation that the parties to
the agreement will be free of corruption and will, on their own,
police themselves is so intrinsic that the instruments creating the
agreements are silent on the topic.
2. Id.
3. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Con-
vention].
4. Id.
5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, PUB. 9433, 392 (July 1995).
6. Id.
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B. Corruption is Pervasive
Unfortunately, the expectation that members to agreements
and the public institutions of members will be free from corrup-
tion is misplaced. Although the existence of public corruption is
an unfortunate fact in all societies, including the United States,
it would appear that cooperative law enforcement agreements
are drafted in ignorance of this reality.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,' as amended, requires
Presidential certification of major drug producing and transit
countries.8 According to the report delivered to Congress in
1995, there were thirty-one countries requiring certification.9
On March 1, 1996, President Clinton certified three countries,
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Paraguay despite their not being in full
compliance, noting that certification was necessary in the na-
tional interest. In the same memorandum, President Clinton
denied certification to Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, Ni-
geria, and Syria.1" In the President's explanatory statement re-
garding his determination concerning seven of these nine coun-
tries, reference is made either to the existence of corruption or
the lack of adequate steps to counter official corruption. Of
these nine countries, eight are members with the United States
in the 1988 U.N. Convention.1 The ninth country, Lebanon, is
"in the process of acceding to the 1988 U.N. Convention."12 All
the nine countries are members of the International Criminal
Police Organization ("Interpol").
Another member of the 1988 U.N. Convention is the Re-
public of Seychelles. That country published on December 4,
1995, the "Economic Development Bill," 3 which appears strik-
ingly inconsistent with the expectations of the Convention in
which the Seychelles is a partner. The Convention asserts that
all parties will do all in their power to address drug trafficking by
forbidding money laundering, tracing and seizing drug assets,
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(h) (1994).
8. Id.
9. Memorandum on Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries, 32 WKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 9 (Mar. 1, 1996).
10. Id.
11. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
PUB. 10324, at xiv-iv (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter INCSR].
12. Id. at xxxviii.
13. Economic Development Bill 1995 Supp. to Official Gazette § 3(2) (Nov. 6, 1995).
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and extraditing and prosecuting traffickers.1 4 The bill which was
approved by the President of the Seychelles on November 27,
1995, creates a board chaired by the President. In addition to
the President, the Board will consist of the Minister for Finance
and four other persons selected by the President.'" The bill au-
thorizes the Board to grant certain concession to "investors."16
The Board on its own or through its chairman, the President,
may grant an "investor" immunity from prosecution for offenses
outside the Seychelles,1 7 as well as for acts of violence or drug
trafficking in Seychelles.1 In addition, the "investor" is granted
"immunity from compulsory acquisition or sequestration of the
assets belonging to the investor" except assets derived from acts
of violence or drug trafficking in the Seychelles. 9 In return for
this immunity, the investor is required only to invest a minimum
of US$10 million in an investment scheme approved by the Pres-
ident and his five colleagues on the Board. 0
On the other side of the globe, Colombia is also a partner in
the 1988 U.N. Convention, 2 as well as party to several bilateral
arrangements with the United States. The International Narcot-
ics Strategy Report for 1995, which is prepared by the U.S. State
Department for Congress,22 reports:
Corruption remains a serious impediment to progress on
counternarcotics in Colombia. High-level government offi-
cials, members of Congress, judicial officials and government
functionaries are under investigation for corrupt activities.
Through corruption, narcotics interests, with their vast sums
of illegally-acquired funds, are influencing the political, judi-
cial, and legislative processes .... The Prosecutor General's
office, under the direction of Alfonso Valdicieso, has pursued
major investigations of government corruption, initiating the
now-famous "Case 8,000," which has implicated over 100
political figures in drug-related corruption. Nine senators are
under criminal investigation, as well as the Samper Adminis-
14. U.N. Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 5, 6, 28 I.L.M. at 502, 504-07.
15. Economic Development Bill, 1995 Supp. to Official Gazette § 3(2) (Nov. 6, 1995).
16. Id. § 5(1).
17. Id. § 7(a).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 7(b).
20. Id. § 5(1).
21. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 5.
22. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(h) (1994).
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tration's Comptroller General, the Attorney General, and for-
mer senior Samper presidential campaign officials for ac-
cepting money or favors from the Cali syndicate or its front
organizations.
In August, Fernando Botero, the manager of President
Samper's 1994 election campaign and formerly his Defense
Minister, was arrested in connection with charges that the
campaign was financed by contributions from narco-traffick-
ers .... Botero later alleged that President Samper knew and
approved of the narco-contributions .... There remain un-
answered questions as to whether senior officials of the GOC
engage, encourage, or facilitate the illicit production or dis-
tribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of
proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 23
Corruption is a lamentable problem in all countries, but it is
more than lamentable when unchecked or officially condoned
corruption operates to check international efforts to address
crime. Indeed, high level or unchecked corruption harms all
nations, notjust the couintry in which the corruption occurs. For
example, one hundred and seventy-six nations are members of
Interpol. Each of these nations accepts the Interpol Constitu-
tion and believes that their energy will be rewarded by the availa-
bility of multinational cooperative investigative assistance in
criminal cases. No member expects that its police or the police
of another member will utilize the system for corrupt purposes.
However, the Interpol Constitution has no mechanism in which
members are obligated to deal with each other and the organiza-
tion honestly. The Constitution has no mechanism to report or
investigate suspected corruption in the system, nor does it pro-
vide sanctions for any of the members for any conduct other
than the failure to pay dues. Similarly, the new Europol Conven-
tion" has little regard to the control of official corruption. The
Europol Convention requires each member nation to establish a
"national unit." National units, in turn, are required to "ensure
compliance with the law in every exchange of information be-
tween themselves and Europol."25 However, the Convention has
23. INCSR, supra note 11, at 84.
24. Convention Based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the
Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), July 20, 1995, Euro-
pol 54, Rev. 5, Annex (1995), openedfor signatureJuly 26, 1995 (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
25. Id. art. 4(1).
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no mechanism for reporting and investigating corruption
among its participants.
Organized crime, and particularly drug trafficking, has
demonstrated the capacity to amass gigantic sums of money.
That money can and has been used to corrupt entire countries
and economies by buying legitimate, necessary industries and
thus, holding the economy hostage or by the more expedient
method of buying the political structure. There continue to be
many examples of this capability to corrupt particularly in the
developing democracies of Eastern Europe2 6 wherein organized
criminals appear to be the first persons to embrace capitalism.
Therefore, no one with any experience in current affairs should
be surprised to encounter corruption while undertaking law en-
forcement efforts among countries. It follows then that the ex-
pectation of success in multinational endeavors will continue to
be frustrated without aggressive actions to address corruption.
C. Multilateral Agreements Must be Reassessed
Traditionally, during the Cold War era, the topic of public
corruption was not addressed among allied nations. Certainly,
the concept of non-interference with domestic affairs of another
sovereign was relied upon to justify this silence. Most impor-
tantly, decisions concerning diplomatic issues were clouded by
the alignment of allies and a strong interest in not driving allied
nations into the arms of one's adversary. In the First Interna-
tional Narcotic Control Strategy Report ("INCSR"), which was
reported to Congress in 1987, countries not certified as being
within the national interest included: Afghanistan, Iran, and
Syria. Laos and Lebanon, however, were certified as being
within the national interest. The remaining nineteen countries
cited were all within the U.S. sphere of influence and all were
certified.
It would appear that the time has passed when considera-
tions concerning the reference to corruption problems can be
avoided on the basis of diplomatic niceties nor extrinsic consid-
erations. It is reassuring to see that Congress requires and the
State Department is becoming more candid concerning issues of
public integrity in their report. The Foreign Assistance Act re-
quires the 1995 INCSR to contain a report on the extent a coun-
26. Sterling, THIEVES WORLD (1994).
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try has "taken legal and law enforcement measures to prevent
and punish corruption, especially by senior government officials
that facilitates the production processing on shipment of nar-
cotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances or
discourages the investigation on prosecution of such acts."27 It is
certainly true that the "public diplomacy" of publishing matters
of corruption for world consideration is one way to draw atten-
tion to the issue and perhaps cause the offending sovereign to
address the issue domestically. However, where organized crime
is firmly entrenched and where corruption reaches the highest
levels of government, it is doubtful that mere public exposure of
this conduct will be enough to cause it to be cured. The Foreign
Assistance Act provides sanctions that include the withholding of
some bilateral assistance to a country not certified by the Presi-
dent and the United States voting against multilateral develop-
ment bank extension of credit to such countries. 8 Ironically,
the assistance withheld is usually assistance in addressing law en-
forcement shortcomings like human rights and public integrity.
The efforts to address corruption by the Foreign Assistance Act
are commendable and take us beyond the earlier prohibitions of
mentioning corruption as being intervention in the domestic af-
fairs of a fellow sovereign. However, these efforts do not address
all of the shortfalls in cooperation.
The United States, as a participant in multilateral efforts to
combat organized crime, needs to recognize that the criminal
conduct being addressed individually and personally harms per-
sons in the United States. Corruption on the part of participants
in these crime-fighting enterprises, which frustrates the purposes
of the enterprises, also personally harms persons in the United
States. Given that recognition, it would appear that addressing
corruption should enjoy a higher priority in the process of deal-
ing with other nations. If the need to combat corruption that
harms multilateral efforts comes to enjoy a higher priority, then
it would appear that the instruments which call for multilateral
cooperation should be reexamined in this light.
A reexamination of multilateral instruments might deter-
mine that those instruments creating multinational law enforce-
ment organizations need reformation. In those organizations,
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (h) (a) (1) (c) (1994).
28. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(j) (a) (1994).
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we must give to the participating sovereigns the ability to report,
investigate, and sanction public corruption which influences
that organization. Thus, in the instance of Interpol, the Consti-
tution should give to the organization the authority to examine
criminal conduct by one of the members when that conduct uses
the instruments of the organization to further a corrupt aim.
Therefore, for instance, if a police department in return for a
bribe sends a fictitious message through Interpol to another po-
lice department for the purpose of locating the assets of an inno-
cent person so that that person might be victimized by criminals,
then that conduct should be sanctioned. The organization
should have the authority to supervise its system to ensure that
the international system set up by the organization is not used
for furtherance of a criminal purpose. The organization should
have the power to impose a range of sanctions, including termi-
nating communications with countries that use its communicat-
ing facilities for criminal purposes.
In the instance of multilateral conventions and bilateral
treaties, the authority to addresses and sanction criminal con-
duct which frustrate the goals of the treaties should be addressed
within the treaties. The sanctions thus developed should be con-
sistent with the purpose of the treaty. An example might be a
treaty which regulates the trade in essential and precursor chem-
icals, that is those chemicals necessary or desirable in the manu-
facture of controlled substances. The sanction for corruptly frus-
trating the goals of the treaty could be as severe as the barring of
the corrupted nations from world trade in those chemicals.
CONCLUSION
The initiative being set out is not to invite nations to inter-
fere in the domestic affairs of other nations nor for nations to set
themselves up to judge all political and public conduct of their
neighbors. This initiative would, however, invite nations to ex-
amine whether or not criminal conduct on the part of one of
their partners can frustrate a common goal that they have estab-
lished with their partners. Nations are invited at the inception
of agreements to agree on vehicles for investigating corruption
which frustrates the agreement and appropriate sanctions for
purposely violating the requirements of honesty.
